In or out : sub-national island jurisdictions and the antechamber of para-diplomacy by Bartmann, Barry
5 In or out: sub-national island 
jurisdictions and the antechamber of 
para-diplomacy 
Barry Bartmann 
THE SETTING 
When East Timor achieved sovereignty on 20 May 2002, the ceremony marked not 
only the end of an agonizing process of self-determination for the islanders of this 
small territory, but also arguably the final act of European decolonization itself. Yet 
was East Timor truly the last scraping of the bottom of the colonial barrel? There are 
various types of dependencies scattered across the oceans of the world, many of them 
islands, still subject to European metropoles. The quest for sovereignty, as the only 
acceptable path to self-determination, does not seem to be the burning issue in these 
few remaining territories. Many are content to maintain the security of metropolitan 
relationships into the distant future. Some, like Aruba, have actually considered and 
then rejected sovereignty as an appropriate future for the island. Most recently in 
Tokelau, with a population of 1500, a referendum on independence failed to win the 
two-thirds majority required as the islanders elected to retain the continued financial 
security of their relationship with New Zealand (Chapman, 2006). In some cases, as 
in Mayotte, a relationship with a distant metropole is seen as a safer and more secure 
association than the possible alternative of dependence on a larger central 
government nearby. 
Yet the recent efforts of Nevis to secede from neighbouring St Kitts are a dramatic 
example of continuing centrifugal forces at play in archipelago states (Premdas, 1998, 
ch. 2; Dee, 2001, ch. 5). Similarly the very small federation of the Comoros has been 
plagued by secessionist movements from the time of its independence, first with 
Mayotte, still in the colonial womb, and more recently with both Moheli and 
Anjouan (Rushby, 2001). Even in the Aland Islands there has been a dramatic growth 
in recent years of a pro-independence movement in public opinion at large, while two 
political parties unequivocally support sovereignty (Anckar, 2002, pp. 221-224). 
The issue of sovereignty, then, is not entirely off the table, even in those small 
sub-national island jurisdictions where domestic debate seems to be preoccupied 
with other issues. It retains a powerful appeal for many Nevisians, it is a pressing 
ambition for many Kanaks of New Caledonia, and it commands persistent minority 
support in other French territories such as Guadeloupe and French Polynesia. It is 
the basis of a government-commissioned report in Bermuda. It continues to shape 
the constitutional debate in the Faeroe Islands and it remains a long-term vision or 
contingency plan in other island jurisdictions such as Greenland or the Isle of Man. 
It is a nostalgic fantasy for many Newfoundlanders as an expression of their 
frustration and discontent in the Canadian federation. Even in tiny Tokelau, 60% 
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of the islanders voted In favour of independence in spite of the economIC risks 
(Chapman, 2006). 
For the most part, however, the remaining small island sub-national jurisdictions 
live contentedly in legally dependent relationships which typically allow considerable 
autonomy and latitude, even in relations with the outside world beyond their 
metropolitan centre. Indeed, the capacity to engage the outside world through varying 
patterns of communication and representation, a phenomenon now widely termed 
'para-diplomacy', is one of the developments inviting a reassessment of these small 
islands' once conventional constitutional future towards sovereignty. The circum-
stances of these small island territories and the current options open to them are 
themselves striking evidence of a rapidly changing international system. 
Long-standing distinctions, both legal and diplomatic, between established 
sovereign states and other international actors seem to be increasingly blurred by 
changing practices in international relations and particularly by the activity of non-
sovereign and unrecognized jurisdictions in external representation. These alternative 
practices of international relations may be seen metaphorically as an antechamber to 
the formal, legal and recognized diplomacy of the grand hall itself. Some entities may 
be able to leave the antechamber for the great hall for specific purposes (such as 
membership of intergovernmental organizations), but not for others (such as the 
accreditation of legations). Others, indeed most others, are confined to the 
antechamber. Sub-national island jurisdictions are among the less recognized players 
in conventional international relations texts; but many of them are now engaged in 
unexpected external relations, acquiring means to enhance their regional and even 
global presence. To be sure, the increasingly assertive external engagement of sub-
national jurisdictions is also evident among other international players: de facto 
states, often 'nations in waiting' (Bahcheli et al., 2004), regional organizations edging 
towards approximations of confederacy, even cities and metropolitan areas seeking to 
create transnational regions of economic activity with some measure of jurisdictional 
or institutional identity transcending the state borders which divide them. In short, 
the remaining 'remnants of empire', as well as small jurisdictions linked with a non-
colonial metropolitan centre, are participating in a rapidly changing global milieu 
characterized by multiple levels of legal, political and diplomatic status and capacity. 
As conventional distinctions of status and prerogatives seem to be blurred, 
particularly between internationally active dependent territories and sovereign states, 
the phenomenon of para-diplomacy appears as both an agent and a consequence of 
that change. It is not surprising, then, that most of the current discussion in the 
literature is focused on jurisdictions below the sovereign state. 
Michael Keating sees the emergence of para-diplomacy as an understandable 
response to powerful currents of change within the international system: globalization 
and the rise of transnational regimes. Both "have eroded the distinction between 
domestic and foreign affairs and by the same token have transformed the division of 
responsibilities between state and subnational governments" (Keating, 1999, p. 1). 
Globalization has expanded economic space beyond the reach of national 
governments, thus pulling sub-national jurisdictions on to the larger stage of 
economic interaction. Both cultural and political consequences follow as states find it 
ever more difficult to exploit their traditional role as guardians of national identity 
with the economic space around them drifting in every direction and new currents of 
activity, linking both local and global players. Similarly, in such a setting, 
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transnational regimes have emerged to meet the challenges of flux in all directions, 
with many such regimes speaking directly to the core interests and central issues of 
sub-national jurisdictions. 
Keating reminds us, however, that the consequences of these changing dynamics 
within the international system do not necessarily fatally erode the importance of 
territorial competence and particularly of territorial identity. Indeed, Keating speaks 
of "the reinvention of territory" as a distinguishing feature of the contemporary 
international system (Keating, 1996, pp. 47-48; see also Bartmann, 1998, pp. 239-
250). Moreover, territorial fault lines within states, particularly multinational states, 
may be accentuated and, if anything, a resurgent localism appears to be an 
unexpected response to globalization (Bartmann, 2000). This may be particularly true 
in small island jurisdictions, where territorial identity is both inescapable and ever 
intrusive and where "the geographies of the mind" (Knight, 1982, p. 517) are so 
pronounced. The affirmation of sub-national territorial identity and jurisdictional 
competence can only induce the elaboration of para-diplomatic relationships and thus 
reinforce the blurring of distinctions of status and privilege that were once at the core 
of international diplomatic practice. 
Para-diplomacy can be best understood as a field of international interaction apart 
from the conventional channels of international diplomacy. Within this field are many 
players with different objectives and, most important, different levels of sanction. 
They include sub-national jurisdictions which may pursue agendas that are broadly 
functional or highly political, that is, identity-reinforcing and even state-building in 
their objectives. Some, following the work of Ivo Duchacek (1986), have narrowly 
defined para-diplomacy as essentially "political- functional contacts with foreign 
countries ... which are bound to have some political dimension" (Lubin, 2003/04, p. 
22). In contrast to this perspective, proto-diplomacy "describes those international 
outreach activities of a non-central government like ... Quebec that tries to graft some 
sort of a strong autonomist or even sovereigntist message onto its economic, social 
and cultural links with foreign countries" (Lubin, 2003/04, p. 22). These distinctions 
are typically very difficult to dissect. Yet identity affirmation may not be a stepping-
stone to secession and the commitment to the latter can be muddied depending on the 
party in power or, more typically, on the vicissitudes of the governing coalition at the 
time. For our purposes in this article the term para-diplomacy refers to all those 
external activities by non-sovereign jurisdictions that stimulate and approximate the 
formal, legal and recognized diplomatic practices of sovereign states. Whatever the 
differences of purpose, all these sub-national players enjoy a latitude of international 
participation that was once far beyond their status, but which is now part of an 
expanding international network. But it is a network sanctioned by their 
metropolitan centres and consequently by the international system, itself still a 
system based on sovereign states. 
It is a field which also includes a wide range of players without sanction, apart 
from a few patron states. These entities still attempt to participate in the same field 
as those which enjoy a recognized measure of legitimacy. For these territories, 
however, de facto states as opposed to sub-national jurisdictions, e.g. Northern 
Cyprus in contrast to the Faeroe Islands, the actual exercise of para-diplomacy is 
hugely different, although the cosmetics are similar. Engagement with sanction, 
however limited, will in the end determine the actual substantive relations of players 
in the field. 
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Para-diplomacy, then, is a field of international activity which simulates or 
approximates official and conventional international relations. All the cases discussed 
in this paper are within this 'antechamber'. But some can simulate the conventions of 
official diplomacy more effectively than others and typically do so with the 
acquiescence of their metropolitan centres and therefore of international society as 
a whole. In these cases long-standing conventions of international diplomacy are 
indeed stretched to accommodate entities that are not sovereign states, although the 
decision to make such accommodations is still vested in those sovereign states. Others 
also seek to simulate established conventions of diplomacy but their presence in the 
antechamber has much less resonance, for they can call upon no sanction, save that of 
a possible patron state or a handful of supporters among the ranks of the sovereign 
membership of international society. The fact that they are allowed to set up shop at 
all in accepting capitals is, of course, an acknowledgement of their presence; but, 
typically, this is countered by strict protocols of neglect and non-engagement. 
For those jurisdictions without such sanction, there are still opportunities to 
participate in this antechamber, but the qualitative substance of that participation is 
very different: they remain quarantined in spite of their frantic activity. They are 
pariahs, near pariahs or simply ignored in even those basic channels of acknowl-
edgement readily granted to sanctioned sub-national participants in the antechamber. 
Para-diplomacy is the outreach of non-sovereign jurisdictions to actors beyond 
their own borders and the frontiers of their metropolitan relationships or claimant 
states. It may involve direct contact with sovereign states with which the metropolitan 
centre already enjoys diplomatic relations. It may include formal channels with other 
sub-national jurisdictions participating in areas of functional cooperation, perceived 
mutual economic advantage and cultural exchange. It may include associate 
membership or even full membership in intergovernmental organizations, particularly 
at the regional level (Corbin, 2001, pp. 136-159). Para-diplomatic missions may be 
simple and understated, a government mission of non-diplomatic status with an ad 
hoc and general mandate of representation and information gathering. This may be 
an office to promote tourism or trade initiatives. Similarly, non-sovereign jurisdictions 
may be the recipients of such para-diplomatic missions and even of consular offices. 
Para-diplomatic missions may even stretch the cosmetic features of the mission to 
simulate full diplomatic status, even though the actual accreditation falls well short of 
legal recognition, typical of the activity which Martin Lubin terms 'proto-diplomacy'. 
Because most sub-national para-diplomatic missions are in functional areas of 
representation, they are frequently viewed as benign by the metropolitan centre. 
Nonetheless, benign or not, they do allow a non-sovereign jurisdiction to reach out 
beyond and around the metropolitan centre to engage in independent exchanges with 
the outside world. This can be particularly valuable if the sub-national jurisdiction 
can participate in intergovernmental organizations with its own delegation and under 
its own auspices and thus with direct access to sovereign governments around the 
world. Quebec has long aspired to a separate delegation at UNESCO and recently the 
newly elected Canadian prime minister, Stephen Harper, indicated that his 
Conservative government is ready to concede this issue (Seguin, 2006, AS). UNESCO 
and other specialized agencies allow for associate membership, which grants 
participation in the agencies' deliberations but without a vote. If this is the formula 
adopted for Quebec, then the province will join Aruba, the Netherlands Antilles, the 
British Virgin Islands, Tokelau, Cayman Islands and Macao as sub-national associate 
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members in UNESCO (Corbin, 2001, p. 143). Yet the Cook Islands and Niue enjoy 
full membership of UNESCO, raising intriguing questions concerning their 
international status. 
The legal rights of sovereign states have long been prized by entities seeking 
international recognition. It is one reason why so many advocates of national self-
determination in the period of postwar decolonization could settle for nothing less 
than sovereignty as the full and final culmination of the self-determination process. 
Sovereignty provided a once dependent territory with a 'green card' with which to 
engage the international system fully and with legal equality on its own terms. It 
would be folly to underestimate the huge symbolic appeal of separate international 
legal personality for many dependent territories, however rational and persuasive the 
functional arguments for alternative forms of constitutional status might be. In no 
situation is the right to full international legal personality more cherished or coveted 
than in de facto states, where actual independence on the ground has meant little in 
their efforts to win international acceptance. The 30-year quarantine of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) would argue powerfully for the substantive 
capacities of recognized international legal personality (Bartmann, 1999, pp. 260-
286). In the case of the TRNC, as in other unrecognized states, governments do 
engage in a necessarily low level of para-diplomacy; but this is still not sufficient to 
circumvent the punitive realities of their own pariah status. 
AMBIGUITIES OF STATUS: THE BRITISH DOMINIONS AND THE 
EUROPEAN MICRO-STATES 
If we consider the historical development of the twentieth-century state system, the 
apparent ambiguities of status and privilege concerning international representation 
are not unique to contemporary developments. With the establishment of the League 
of Nations in 1919, a shift to an inclusive and egalitarian ethos in international 
relations was clear and with it the problems of status and rights attending issues of 
membership. The international legal status of some founding members of the League 
was not unlike that of many of today's small island sub-national jurisdictions. League 
membership was seen to be an acknowledgement of international legal personality, 
'fledgling' though it might be (Granatstein and Hillmer, 1991, p. 74), given the 
emphasis placed on the capacity of member states to fulfil their obligations under the 
Covenant, particularly Article 16, with its expectations of collective responsibility. 
The historic narrative in this context is one of ambiguity and mixed signals. While 
accepting India, still a British colony, or Britain's dominions, as members of the 
League, the Admissions Committee refused the application of Liechtenstein, a long-
standing European principality whose sovereignty and statehood the Committee 
acknowledged and whose application was enthusiastically sponsored by Switzerland 
(Gunter, 1974, pp. 496-501). Liechtenstein's rejection reflected assumptions about 
the nature of sovereignty and the attributes of statehood that were conventional at the 
time: in 1919 Liechtenstein initiated agreements with Switzerland which included 
Switzerland's representation of Liechtenstein's interests abroad when called upon to 
so act by the government in Vaduz. Most of these agreements did not take effect until 
after Liechtenstein's application had been rejected (Raton, 1970, pp. 76 - 77). 
Nevertheless, the Committee reasoned that because Liechtenstein had "chosen to 
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depute to others some of the attributes of its sovereignty ... we are of the opinion that 
the Principality of Liechtenstein could not discharge all the international obligations 
which would be imposed on it by the Covenant" (League of Nations, 1920, p. 667). 
Yet other members, notably self-governing Dominions and colonies, did not possess 
the 'attributes of sovereignty' which Liechtenstein was alleged to have 'surrendered'. 
As Michael Gunter concluded: "the real reason for the rejection of Liechtenstein was 
her smallness, not her deputation of some sovereign attributes" (Gunter, 1974, p. 
499). Moreover, as he further noted, Liechtenstein's rejection was "by inference" a 
rejection of "other ministates which might apply in the future" (Gunter, 1974, p. 
499). Indeed, Luxembourg proved to be the single, notable exception (Hudson, 
1935). 
Iceland's constitutional status in the Danish Realm was not unlike that of the 
Dominions in the British Empire. Iceland did approach the League in 1918 through 
the French Foreign Ministry and it did so again in 1930, the 1000th anniversary of the 
Althing. But Icelanders showed little enthusiasm for League membership because, as 
Jonas Jonsson, Minister of Justice at the time, put it, "of smallness, poverty and a 
kind of shyness" (Grandal, 1974, p. 25). Iceland's representations and interests in the 
world continued to be conducted by the Danes, although Iceland maintained an 
embassy in Copenhagen and posted Icelandic trade attaches to some embassies and 
consulates. With Germany's invasion and occupation of Denmark in 1940, Iceland 
established missions of its own in Washington, London and Moscow (Grandal, 1974, 
p. 25). With independence in 1944 Iceland developed a full diplomatic service. For the 
other European micro-states, their international relations were confined to the 
margins of international diplomatic practice during this long interregnum. While they 
were sovereign states and ceremonially treated as such, in substance their external 
relations were para-diplomatic in nature and highly qualified; much the same as the 
external relations of non-sovereign jurisdictions today. 
PARADIPLOMACY AS A STATE-BUILDING INSTRUMENT FOR DE FACTO 
STATES 
The end of the decolonization process may be symbolically recognized in the final 
transfer of sovereignty to East Timor. But it was also marked by the international 
admission of 'leftovers' of the Westphalian system where events finally caught up with 
their long neglect. After St Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and Principe, and the 
Seychelles, what residual arguments could be mounted against Liechtenstein, the most 
industrialized country per capita in the world, or San Marino, the oldest continuing 
sovereign state in Europe? In short, the eventual course of self-determination 
weakened whatever inhibitions constrained these states and the residual resistance 
within the international system itself, thus emboldening them to leave the 
antechamber and gatecrash the grand hall. 
These 'state-building' functions of para-diplomacy are still powerful motives for 
some non-sovereign jurisdictions and players beyond the pale of normal international 
relations. For unrecognized, de facto states the search for legal recognition and the 
formal acknowledgement of their legal existence as self-governing nations are the core 
issues of their agenda. The TRNC is recognized by Turkey, of course, but it is a pariah 
state everywhere else, even in Europe, where its territory lies within the European 
The antechamber of para-diplomacy 59 
Union. The Cyprus issue is truly a bizarre combination of fiction and pretension. The 
territory of the TRNC is legally part of the space of the European Union but subject to 
an EU blockade. The TRNC is even shunned officially in the Islamic world, where 
there are prominent non-official constituencies of co-religionists and even muted 
empathy in official corridors. The TRNC has established, in addition to its embassy 
and consulates in Turkey, a network of representatives or missions in key capitals (see 
Table 5.1), but the nomenclature remains as ambiguous as the status of its personnel. 
Even in this understated presentation, these missions remain off the radar screen of 
official exchange. 
In the TRNC case host countries insist these missions be registered as The Office of 
the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community and, of course, their personnel 
cannot claim diplomatic visas, an issue which presents recurring problems for the 
officers at these stations. For the missions in the Islamic capitals the rules of the 
European blockade are not in effect and consequently these missions are designated 
with a more official status as Trade and Tourism offices. But in Geneva, the mission 
exists physically and functionally as part of Turkey's permanent mission. 
THE ANOMALY OF TAIWAN 
There are certain entities which seek similar acknowledgement as the de facto states 
discussed above. These are governments-in-exile whose territory lies beyond their reach 
and, indeed, whose separation from that territory may span many generations as their 
lonely diplomats seek to keep the flicker of their national candle alive in distant capitals. 
At one time, when international divisions were more profound, these governments were 
common, particularly for the German-occupied territories during World War II. In the 
postwar years Western powers allowed the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania to maintain their legations and did not recognize their legal incorporation 
into the Soviet Union, even as they acknowledged that these three republics were 
functioning as units subject to Soviet law and practice. In the contemporary 
international system the Chinese occupation of Tibet since 1949 continues to provoke 
anti-Chinese and pro-Tibetan demonstrations and activities around the world. 
Yet, difficult as the question of Tibet is for China, Taiwan is the most pressing 
issue. The Republic of China on Taiwan may be superficially regarded as a 
Table 5.1 Para-diplomatic missions of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
TRNC, Representatives Offices 
London: Office of the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Baku: Trade and Tourism Office of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Brussels: Office of the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Washington: Office of the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
New York: Office of the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community, UN Plaza 
Islamabad: Trade and Tourism Office of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Abu Dhabi: Trade and Tourism Office of the Turkish Cypriot Community 
Geneva: Office of the Representative of the Turkish Cypriot Community, Permanent Mission of 
Turkey 
Source: www.trncgov.comlrepresentativesoffices.htm. 
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government-in-exile. The Taipei government continues to maintain, after nearly 60 
years, that it is the legitimate government of the whole of China. Of course, the island 
government maintains authority only over Taiwan itself and a handful of offshore 
islands. Nevertheless, 23 countries in the world recognize Taiwan (as the Republic of 
China) and allow it to have an embassy (along with Panama, which maintains a 
Taiwan Consulate-General). Fifteen countries (Belize, Burkina Faso, Dominion 
Republic, St Kitts-Nevis, Swaziland, El Salvador, The Gambia, Honduras, Marshall 
Islands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon 
Islands) have a resident diplomatic embassy in Taiwan. For 66 other countries, 
however, many with extensive and hugely important economic links to Taiwan, 
relations are of a purely para-diplomatic nature and - given China's own 
preoccupation on this issue - with a highly sensitive nomenclature to describe 'non-
official' missions, although they may very well operate as de facto embassies. (Indeed, 
the most common nomenclature for the Taiwan office in their country is 'Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office'.) For 57 of these countries there are para-diplomatic 
resident missions in Taipei, with such names as the Argentina Trade and Cultural 
Office, the Malaysia Friendship and Trading Centre, and American Institute in 
Taiwan. Similar cosmetic fudging has allowed for some Taiwanese participation in 
international bodies such as the Olympics and for direct personal representations 
between Taiwanese government leaders and their counterparts in other states. In 
short, Taiwan is at once a normal state, a government-in-exile and a de facto state 
engaging in both official and internationally recognized channels of diplomacy in 
some cases and cloaked para-diplomatic exchanges in others. Taiwan is an 
international anomaly both in and out of the antechamber (see www.mofa.gov.tw). 
What is perhaps most striking here is that Taiwan, a major regional economic and 
military power, and one of the most stable democracies in Asia, is still very dependent 
on para-diplomacy in the antechamber of international relations. The official and 
recognized delegations which Taiwan receives as the Republic of China are confined 
to very small states, themselves on the margins of the international system. In 
contrast, Taiwan's para-diplomatic reach is dramatic in the status of its state partners 
and in the sheer numbers of its own para-diplomatic operations abroad. Similarly 
impressive is the number of major states (57) which maintain para-diplomatic 
missions on the island. In short, in spite of its economic clout and its strategic stature, 
Taiwan continues to engage the international system on two different levels; and it is 
the more informal, unofficial, para-diplomatic level which clearly provides for this 
controversial island's most critical relationships. Of course, this speaks to the depth of 
the taboo of Taiwanese separation and the paramount urgency of the territorial 
integrity principle for mainland China. Nevertheless, these circumstances also reflect 
the very elasticity of the para-diplomatic mission. The nomenclature chosen can 
convey simply a non-governmental relationship, so as to emphasize the distance 
between the emissary state and Taiwan. Note that some of the designations of foreign 
missions in Taipei are those of non-governmental bodies, such as the Swedish Trade 
Councilor the Spanish Chamber of Commerce. Others, perhaps less sensitive to 
mainland sensibilities, even go so far as to include 'The Republic of China' in the 
registration of their offices in Taipei. Taiwan's own offices abroad indicate a fairly 
common standard, with an emphasis on trade, investment and cultural exchanges. In 
any case, both the para-diplomatic Taiwan missions abroad and the foreign para-
diplomatic missions in Taipei carryon many substantive diplomatic duties. Taiwan's 
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unique position in the international system enables it to follow established diplomatic 
protocols in some situations but to resort to para-diplomacy in most of its critical 
relationships with other states. Taiwan's major activity in an international 
organization is its membership in the World Trade Organization, where it maintains 
a regular permanent mission, although it comes under the awkward title of the Special 
Customs Territories of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. 
THE PARADIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES OF SUB-NATIONAL ISLAND 
JURISDICTIONS 
The non-sovereign small island jurisdictions across the globe represent as broad a 
tapestry as any we have examined thus far. Some of them are still in essentially 
metropolitan relationships with European states: the non-sovereign islands in the 
Caribbean, for example, are British, French or Dutch territories, or very closely linked 
to the USA. Apart from the French-administered island territories in the South Pacific, 
and the lonely British island of Pitcairn, the small islands of this region are in varying 
associated relationships with Australia, New Zealand and the USA. There are many 
small islands which are essentially municipal, county or occasionally provincial 
jurisdictions of mainland states. And there are those European islands, the Danish and 
Finnish home rule territories and the ancient Crown dependencies of the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man, with a very distinctive constitutional status. 
Para-diplomatic practices are being established and developed in several of these 
islands and, like the regions of the European Union, these activities vary in terms of 
the primacy given to political and identity issues and a more modest economic and 
functional agenda. It may seem surprising that the Crown dependencies, among the 
most historic of European jurisdictions and independent in so many respects, have not 
been drawn to separate representation beyond their shores. The British Home Office 
conducts whatever relations are necessary with Brussels or any other capital as issues 
arise. There has been no groundswell in these islands for a separate para-diplomatic 
network apart from these trusted good offices. 
In some islands, however, there is a question of national island identity, which has 
encouraged an international projection of the island in the establishment of para-
diplomatic offices. The Faeroe Islands are an example of the blend of identity and 
functional interests that make para-diplomatic representation attractive for many 
sub-national jurisdictions. The national question or the home rule question has 
dominated Faeroese politics throughout the postwar period. Following Maurice 
Duverger's model of "overlapping or equally competing cleavages" (Duverger, 1959, 
pp. 231-33), Faeroese political scientist Jogvan M0rk0re has argued that this 
question has been as divisive in Faeroese politics as the conventional social-economic 
state - market divisions on a familiar left - right continuum, thus producing a 
multiparty system with party formations based on ideological mixes across these 
two definitive issue-areas (M0rk0re, 1997, pp. 162-191). 
Following the German invasion of Denmark in April 1940, the British occupied the 
islands and urged the islanders to fly their own flag at sea rather than the Danish red 
and white cross (Schei and Moberg, 1991, pp. 40-41). The years of British 
occupation were for "all intents and purposes, a period of Home Rule" (Schei and 
Moberg, 1991, pp. 40-41), which paved the way for a Danish-crafted referendum in 
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September 1946, offering a choice between independence and some form of self-
government within the Danish Realm. Although the vote was exceedingly narrow 
(5650 for independence against 5500 for union), the Danish government initially 
accepted the results, as did the Faeroese L0gting. But the Danes soon rescinded their 
position, the L0gting was dissolved and new elections resulted in a government in 
favour of autonomy within the Union. The result was the Home Rule Act of 1948, in 
which the Faeroes were made "a self-governing community within the Danish 
Realm" enjoying a wide latitude of autonomy in domestic affairs, although foreign 
affairs and defence remained the prerogative of the Danish government in 
Copenhagen. The debate over independence did not abate, however, and in 1999 
the Faeroese government, now led by a coalition committed to independence, laid out 
a detailed schema for an independent Faeroese state. One of the key chapters in this 
'White Book' looked to the future international relations and security policy of an 
independent Faeroese state (see Table 5.2). 
The Faeroes currently maintain three representative offices: London and Brussels 
with diplomatic status and Copenhagen without diplomatic status. The offices in 
London and Brussels "are located within the Danish embassies and the Faeroese 
diplomats are formally accredited to the respective host nations as Danish diplomats 
working with Faeroese affairs" (Isfeld, 2006). The Faeroese missions could be housed 
in another location, although they would still be regarded as part of the Danish 
Embassy. This arrangement is not unlike the position of the Canadian minister in the 
British Embassy in Washington in the years following Wodd War I. And it is an 
arrangement in keeping with the Danish practice of providing means and channels for 
Faeroese representatives to speak directly to third parties on issues of importance to 
the Faeroes (Olafsson, 2000, pp. 127 -129). Moreover, this para-diplomatic activity 
reflects further changes in the relationship between Torshavn and Copenhagen. On 29 
July 2005, a new law involving the Islands' external relations came into effect. It 
allows 
the Faeroese government to enter into negotiations and conclude treaties with 
other states and international organizations without previous consent from 
Denmark regarding all areas that are under the Faeroese authorities ... The 
Faeroes can accordingly negotiate and conclude on its own [emphasis added] a 
bilateral treaty with another state regarding trade, culture, fisheries or any other 
Table 5.2 Expected diplomatic establishment of an independent Faeroes as set out in White 
Book of 1999 
Reykjavik: Embassy 
Oslo: Embassy, accredited to Moscow 
Copenhagen: Embassy, accredited to Stockholm, consular office in Helsingfors 
London: Embassy, accredited to Dublin 
Washington: Embassy, accredited to Canada, Mexico and Central and South American states 
Brussels: Embassy, accredited to all European states, except Norway, Russia, UK and Ireland: 
accredited to the European Union, OECD, WTO, NATO, OSCE 
New York: Permanent Mission to the UN, accredited to Asian and African states 
Source: Government of Faroes (1999, pp. 75 -77). 
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business where the legislation and execution in the Faeroes lies with the Faeroese 
authorities. 
(Isfeld, personal communication, 20 January 2006) 
This gives considerable substance to a Faeroese para-diplomatic network and is a 
clear demonstration of shared responsibilities between sovereign and sub-national 
governments, even in the sensitive areas of foreign policy typically seen as exclusively 
the prerogatives of the sovereign state (Olafsson, 2000, pp. 127 -129). 
There have been even more dramatic developments of late. In September 2007, the 
Faeroes opened a mission in Reykjavik as indicated in their 1999 White Book wish 
list. In December 2007, the Faeroes became an associate member of the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation (FAO) (www.tirnganes.fo). Following the January 2008 
elections, a new three party coalition government was formed with the Social 
Democrats, the Independence Party and the Centre Party. H0gni Hoydal, the leader 
of the Independence Party, became Minister of Foreign Affairs (www.tinganes.fo). 
There are now plans to open three more Faeroese missions: in Geneva, Moscow and 
New York, bringing the total number of Faeroese offices of representation to seven 
(J6annes Vitalis Hansen, Faeroese Civil Service, personal communication, June 2008). 
There is a similar permissive latitude in the case of the other Danish home rule 
island territory, Greenland, although there has not been a comparable 50-year debate 
on the issue of home rule or independence. Greenland representatives have a similar 
power to negotiate directly on issues within the purview of the Home Rule 
Government (Larsen, 1992, pp. 219 - 220; Motzfeldt, 1997, pp. 193 -194). Green-
land maintains Representative Offices in Copenhagen and Brussels, the latter a direct 
monitoring base of EU developments that could directly affect the island (see 
www.Nanoq.gl/english.aspx). Both the Faeroes and Greenland host consulates from 
major European states. There are nine consulates in Torshavn: Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. There are also 
nine consulates in Nuuk: Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Moreover, both Greenland and the Faeroes sit as 
separate members of the Nordic Council of Ministers. (The three Baltic states have 
observer rights.) This participation in an important intergovernmental organization 
allows for relations with other member states and assures both territories of a genuine 
role in regional issues of importance to them. 
The case of the Aland Islands is particularly interesting. Its status is unique since it 
is rooted in international law as the consequence of a decision of the League of 
Nations. Given the many particular jurisdictional guarantees which the Alands can 
claim under the Autonomy Act with Finland (Myntti, 2002, pp. 107-124), the 
islanders had the right to determine whether or not they would join the European 
Union. In theory, Finland could have acceded to EU membership while the Alands 
stayed out. Their autonomous status is also reflected in their separate membership in 
the Nordic Council, a privilege which they share with the Danish home rule 
territories. They are then in a position to reap the benefits of direct relations with their 
regional partners (Anckar and Bartmann, 2000). 
However, their situation with the European Union is not as satisfying as initially 
expected. The Alanders were able to extract some critical derogations from Brussels 
during the accession negotiations, particularly on the economically critical issue of 
continued duty-free shopping on Aland ferries (Scarpulla, 2002, pp. 138 -141; 
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Jansson, 2002, pp. 201- 212). Duty-free arrangements were abolished elsewhere in 
the European Union and this concession was certainly significant and contributed 
immensely to the 74% vote in favour of membership in the November 1994 
referendum (Aland Legislative Assembly). However, since this initial success, 
islanders have become more disenchanted with the Union over a number of issues 
that are deemed important to their way of life and even their economic well-being. 
The first EU negative decision was the banning of traditional nets by island fishers, a 
decision that applied across the ED. This was followed by the abolition of spring duck 
hunting and most recently the banning of snus, a Swedish chewing tobacco, which is 
allowed only in Sweden, a special derogation to Stockholm and (until now) the 
Alands. Snus chewing is a habit enjoyed by many Islanders, even though Finland 
accepted the ban on the mainland. Since Finland cannot change laws covering health 
in the Alands, the parliament in Helsinki has no power to change the law on snus. The 
real problem here is one central to our discussion: a lack of direct representation. 
Although there is an Aland representative presence in the Finnish delegation in 
Brussels, the Aland Islands cannot represent themselves directly in Brussels on issues 
which are exclusive to them or primarily affect them. In an angry reaction over the 
snus controversy, Britt Lundberg, the Alands head of EU affairs, has threatened to use 
the power to veto any Finnish international treaty. The threat implies that Aland will 
thwart Helsinki's commitment to revive the moribund European Constitution when 
Finland assumes the rotating presidency of the European Council later in 2006 
(Rennie, 2006). While the Aland Islands maintains representatives in Stockholm, 
Helsinki and Brussels, it is a rather 'toothless' arrangement if Aland cannot make its 
own case directly. The European Court in Luxembourg will hear only from member 
states, clearly a provision that denies the regions a capacity which is the very logic of 
para-diplomatic representation. 
Neither the Faeroes nor Greenland is subject to such EU edicts. The Faeroes did not 
join at the time of Danish accession and Greenland seceded from the EU in 1985, the 
only territory yet to do so, after achieving home rule government in 1979. The Danish 
permissive policy, to include Faeroese and Greenlandic representatives in negotiating 
arrangements which directly affect their interests (e.g. on the Nordic Council), is an 
optimal and positive template for small sub-national jurisdictions. It speaks to the 
very purpose expected of para-diplomatic activity among sub-national governments, 
an opportunity to reach out and address their particular interests while remaining 
inside a metropolitan relationship which offers many benefits to the citizenry of these 
territories. 
The efficacy of regional institutions as channels for the international outreach and 
representation of sub-national or non-sovereign territories is particularly well 
established in the Commonwealth Caribbean. Caricom, the Caribbean Community, 
has 15 member states, which include the very small island of Montserrat. If, at one 
time, Montserrat contemplated independence, any prospects were dashed by the 1995 
eruption of the Soufriere volcano, which destroyed the capital, Plymouth, and forced 
the emigration of 8000 islanders, two-thirds of the population. Some have returned, 
but the island's habitable space is now confined to a small section of the northwest. 
Soufriere erupts regularly and the island has been continually hit by hurricanes. In 
short, the status of Montserrat as a British overseas territory is unlikely to change. 
The same may be said of the other very small British islands in the Caribbean: 
Anguilla, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands and the Turks and Caicos 
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Islands. Along with Bermuda, where independence is being debated, these four small 
island territories are associate members of Caricom. Anguilla, Montserrat and the 
British Virgin Islands are also among the nine full members of the Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). Thanks to these two major regional bodies the 
smallest non-sovereign islands have an extensive 'diplomatic reach' which largely 
mitigates the need for and the appeal of sovereignty. Moreover, the OECS has its own 
diplomatic missions in Ottawa and Brussels, which allows Montserrat and the other 
very small island members a direct diplomatic channel to the outside world. Caricom 
maintains a permanent observer mission to the UN in New York, which is another 
channel of outreach for its non-sovereign members and associate members. These are 
generous and practical measures in keeping with a spirit of flexibility concerning 
status and privileges for non-state jurisdictions. 
Bermuda stands apart from the other British overseas territories in the region since 
independence has been a matter of domestic debate for some years. In the referendum 
of 16 August 1995 the independence option was defeated, but largely because the 
parties could not agree on the appropriate vehicle for achieving independence. The 
Progressive Labour Party, which has long advocated independence, has subsequently 
won two national elections and in 2004 Premier Alexander Scott established the 
Bermuda Independence Commission (BIC) to revisit the issue. The Commission was 
chaired by Bishop Vernon G. Lambe and its report was published in August 2005. 
The Commission's work involved wide-ranging consultation with the British 
government, the US Department of State, Canada, the European Union, and various 
countries of the region (BIC, 2005). 
At present the UK is responsible for Bermuda's external affairs both as the island's 
interlocutor with other states and its representative in major intergovernmental 
associations apart from Caricom. In the current arrangements, however, Bermuda 
does have input into issue-areas which directly affect the island. The Bermuda 
Independence Commission noted these provisions in its 2005 report: 
Britain, in negotiating a treaty on Bermuda's behalf, receives input from the 
Bermuda Government regarding matters affecting Bermuda and, in turn, the 
British Government keeps Bermuda appraised of the progress of the negotiations. 
At times Bermuda representatives are present as observers. The British 
Government has delegated some authority for certain treaty negotiations to 
Bermuda through the 1968 Entrustment. With greater frequency, Ministers of the 
Bermuda Government are, with prior approval, thus permitted to negotiate 
certain agreements, provided that they keep the British Government informed. 
One example is the Tax Convention that Bermuda was allowed to negotiate 
directly with the US. 
(BIC, 2005, p. 17) 
These arrangements approximate those in place for the Danish home rule territories. 
On the other hand, Bermuda has not sought a high-profile network of para-
diplomatic representation. Bermuda maintains tourist offices in Atlanta, Beverly 
Hills, Boston, London, New York and Toronto. Unlike other British small island 
overseas territories (Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Falklands, 
Montserrat, the Turks and Caicos, and St Helena), Bermuda does not have a 
Representative Office in London (see www.embassies.com). However, there are two 
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consulates (Portugal and the USA) and 16 Honorary Consuls resident in Hamilton: 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Jamaica, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland 
(Bermuda Embassy and Consulate Listing, 2008). 
Independence for Bermuda would mean virtually starting from scratch. With this in 
mind, the Bermuda Independence Commission envisaged two options for the 
establishment of a Foreign Ministry and diplomatic staff. It is interesting to compare 
these projections with those of the Faeroese White Book of 1999 discussed above. 
Option One (total projected annual costs: $1336000) would upgrade the Tourism 
Office in New York to a diplomatic mission, along with the establishment of an 
embassy in Washington and high commissions in Ottawa and London. Bermuda's 
relations with the European Union would be handled from either Bermuda or London. 
Bermuda would join the UN and its lead agencies and the Commonwealth (BIC, 2005, 
pp. 43-44). Option Two (total projected annual costs; $3051000) also expects that 
Bermuda would join the UN and its agencies, and the Commonwealth, with possible 
full membership of Caricom if this did not involve the Caribbean Single Market and 
Economy or the Caribbean Court of Justice (BIC, 2005, pp. 44-45). Independence 
could mean membership in other agreements such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the Organization of American States, the World Trade Organization, the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the 
European Union's Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) organization. Overseas missions 
would be established in Washington, Ottawa, New York, London and Brussels. The 
report suggests that, in the many countries where Bermuda would not have a mission, it 
would continue to rely on the UK to represent its citizens and interests and the 
reimbursement costs of these services are factored into the report's projected costs of 
independence. The report is confident that, in the end, the costs of independence 
"would not be outside the afford ability of Bermuda" (BIC, 2005, p. 59). 
Of course, costs and benefits cross a broad range of issues. In response to the report, 
the Royal Gazette noted that the issue of a British passport was 'glossed over', a 
privilege which presently gives Bermudians the right to live and work anywhere in the 
European Union (Royal Gazette, 2005). "And", the Gazette warns, "once it is lost, it 
would almost certainly be gone forever". But the Gazette also notes that: "For some 
black Bermudians, in particular, Independence represents a final act of freedom" 
(Royal Gazette, 2005). This echoes the clear symbolic priority in the report for the 
Progressive Labour government: 
Some Black Bermudians associate Bermuda's current colonial status as being only 
slightly removed from its history of slavery and segregation. An advantage for 
them is the logical and necessary step towards full emancipation. This may be a 
difficult concept for some in the White community to grasp; but, until they do, it 
is nigh impossible to have a meaningful debate on the subject ... here is a 
significant sector of the Bermudian population who feel that full emancipation, 
full adulthood and full equality may only be achieved when the last vestiges of 
colonialism have been removed. 
(BIC, 2005, pp. 61- 62) 
Clearly, this debate would not be conducted in most of the small non-sovereign 
islands subject to metropolitan relationships. But in Bermuda it lies at the core of the 
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question. A detached assessment of Bermuda's status would suggest that the island's 
current relationship with the UK is largely beneficial, even in terms of external links 
and overseas representation. Yet it is precisely in this area that the report concludes 
there would be clear gains with independence: "A distinct advantage to an 
independent Bermuda could be the value of international relationships and 
organizations and the expertise available to emerging nations" (BIC, 2005, p. 62). 
Clearly the case for para-diplomatic outreach within a continuing metropolitan 
relationship has not been conclusive in the Bermuda debate. 
In the South Pacific there is a pattern of permissive arrangements both in terms of 
regional intergovernmental bodies and in the particular latitude granted by New 
Zealand with the status of free association. The Pacific Islands Forum represents the 
heads of government of all its 16 members. The Cook Islands and Niue, both states in 
free association with New Zealand, are full members (see www.forumsec.org.fj). 
Most remarkable for this discussion is the international legal personality of these 
territories. New Zealand officially describes the Cook Islands as "a self-governing 
state in free association with New Zealand" (Government of New Zealand, n.d., p. 
7). "New Zealand cannot make laws for the Cook Islands ... the Cook Islands 
Government has full executive powers ... The Cook Islands remains a part of the 
Realm of New Zealand (albeit a separate part) ... Cook Islanders retain New Zealand 
citizenship (and do not have additional Cook Islands citizenship" (Government of 
New Zealand, n.d., p. 7). 
The separate international legal personality of the Cook Islands, given their New 
Zealand citizenship, truly illustrates the elasticity and innovation possible within the 
context of 'dependent relationships' (see Table 5.3). 
Moreover, the Cook Islands has established separate diplomatic relations with 
over 20 states at embassy or high commission level. The Cook Islands High 
Commission in Wellington is also accredited as the Cook Islands High Commission 
to Australia, Papua New Guinea and Fiji. The Cook Islands Embassy in Brussels is 
also accredited to the European Union. There are in fact no fewer than 23 states 
(including Australia, New Zealand, the USA and the European Union) with full 
diplomatic relations accredited to the Cook Islands at the embassy or high 
commission level. There is also a supplementary consular network with honorary 
consuls for the Cook Islands in Honolulu, Los Angeles, Oslo, Sydney and a 
consulate-general in Auckland. There are honorary consuls in Avarua Town for the 
UK, France and Germany and a warden for the USA. The Cook Islands has 
Table 5.3 Membership of the Cook Islands in international organizations 
Asian Development Bank 
Food and Agriculture Organization 
World Health Organization 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
Commonwealth (Associate member) 
UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Associate member) 
Pacific Islands Forum 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community 
Source: Government of the Cook Islands (2005). 
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independently concluded treaties with a number of states, including China, the USA, 
the Republic of Korea and France (Government of the Cook Islands, 2005). 
This very small state is also an independent signatory to several multilateral 
conventions, including the Cotonou Agreement between the ACP states and the 
European Union. 
A similar status is enjoyed by Niue, also a self-governing state in free association 
with New Zealand, but on a more modest scale. New Zealand has a high 
commission resident in Alofi, Niue, and, astonishingly, Niue maintains a high 
commission in Wellington and shares an ambassador and embassy with the Cook 
Islands in Brussels, although the two states are accredited separately (see 
www.embassypages.com) . 
Even in Tokelau New Zealand will only act on behalf of this tiny territory if 
instructed to do so by the government of Tokelau. This was precisely the arrangement 
for Swiss representation of Liechtenstein until the late postwar years, an arrangement 
which many jurists insisted at the time was one that unequivocally established the 
sovereignty of the principality (Farran, 1960). 
The Cook Islands has not presented itself to the international community as a 
sovereign state, although it behaves in exactly that fashion in its international 
relations. Cook Islanders are New Zealand citizens and that citizenship is clearly of 
value in itself, given the large Cook Islands population in New Zealand. The islanders 
are able to enjoy all the prerogatives of sovereignty with the most permissive and 
generous arrangements for international relations available to any dependent territory 
in the world. Indeed, to return to our opening historical discussion, the Cook Islands 
today enjoys an official diplomatic reach beyond the smallest European states before 
1990, even though the European micro-states were classified, at least formally, as 
sovereign entities at the time. 
In short, these are arrangements far beyond what is understood to be the various 
practices of para-diplomacy. When a territory has the separate and independent legal 
capacity to enter into full diplomatic relations with other states, to send and receive 
missions at the embassy level, to negotiate bilateral treaties, to be a signatory to 
multilateral conventions, to participate independently in intergovernmental organiza-
tions, especially when those organizations' membership is confined to sovereign 
states, then what is possibly left to meet the full international legal personality of 
sovereignty? 
Only UN membership remains absent for the Cook Islands, but this was never a 
litmus test unto itself. Until very recently some states did not apply for UN 
membership, even though their sovereignty was not in question: (Western) Samoa 
achieved independence in 1962 but did not join the UN until 1976. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The twenty-first-century international system is more universal and inclusive in that 
full international legal personality is shared by jurisdictions which would have been 
considered improbable and absurd as sovereign states even in 1960 at the beginning 
of the mass suffrage of colonial territories. Indeed, the apparent ambiguities of 
status and international prerogatives beyond decolonization have reinforced an 
ongoing trend to universalism and inclusiveness, a trend which is dramatically 
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reflected in the expanding opportunities and practices in the antechamber of para-
diplomacy. 
Across this comparative and historical view of para-diplomatic practices there is a 
consistent pattern of muddied credentials for access to and status within the central 
international channels of diplomacy. Moreover, there are very different kinds of 
entities to be found in this antechamber and it is important to retain a clear sense of 
these distinctions when assessing the phenomenon of para-diplomacy in general. 
Some of these distinctions have been noted in the current literature on para-
diplomatic practices among sub-national units in federations and regions in the 
European Union. There are jurisdictions which entertain 'national' or 'identity' 
agendas with pressing political objectives: Quebec, Flanders, Catalonia, and to some 
extent even certain small island sub-national entities such as the Faeroes. Most others 
engage in para-diplomatic practices for relatively modest functional objectives, and 
these efforts are almost entirely focused on information: "they gather information 
concerning [EU] legislation; they exchange information in subnational networks; they 
mediate information to their respective home territories, and they provide 
information to [EU] decision makers" (Marks et al., 2002, p. 2). 
Are some of the entities more likely to develop or win para-diplomatic practices 
than others? Clearly those jurisdictions with a distinct identity agenda can be 
expected to pursue a para-diplomatic outreach aggressively. And small islands, 
because of their physical separateness and insularity, are obvious candidates for the 
same reasons that they have gained self-government and even constitutional 
separateness. However, all sanctioned para-diplomatic practices function within the 
context of a national or metropolitan relationship and with the consent of the central 
government. To be sure, agitation and political pressure for greater status recognition 
and external access from the jurisdiction itself may well result in the central 
government moving cautiously beyond its own initial comfort levels. But it is a sphere 
which is only accessible if the metropolitan or central government agrees. It is not 
some new and swampy terrain of international relations which sub-national 
governments can enter by stealth. It is not a case of a state being ambushed by its 
dependent units, suddenly, awkwardly and embarrassingly discovered in the 
antechamber by sheer chutzpah. No, there are guards at the door and credentials 
are checked; only those with a metropolitan stamp of approval are admitted. The 
Faeroes mission in London, the Montserrat delegation at Caricom and the Cook 
Islands Embassy in Brussels function within the legitimacy of external representation 
as acknowledged by their metropolitan centres and therefore by the international 
system itself. 
Para-diplomacy is not a new and innovative sphere of international relations, 
much less one that undermines the finality of sovereign states' judgements on 
international status and access. Para-diplomacy is not a breach of conventional 
distinctions in diplomatic practice as much as a redefinition of the frontiers of 
domestic authority within sovereign states, conceding practices which central 
governments in some cases have come to accept and even promote for their 
dependent territories. Indeed, in those cases where para-diplomacy seems to be 
most advanced and conventional distinctions of status most blurred, the new 
parameters of international engagement and outreach are determined in the end 
where they have always been determined: in the capitals of the sovereign members 
of the international system. 
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